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Preface 
The following study is a theoretical elaboration of part of an investigation 
carried out by the author in 1970 as an undergraduate research assistant in 
the Department of Extension Education of the Agricultural University, 
Wageningen. The investigation concerned the influence of social and 
psychological factors on the results achieved by a team of staff members 
of the Agricultural University who were assigned the task of drawing up 
a regional plan for a Southeast Asian country.1 This "exercise in regional 
planning" was set up with the object of compiling a handbook for regional 
planning in the tropics, the achievement of which constantly posed problems 
for the team. 
One of the conclusions to emerge from the investigation was that the 
team had initially worked from a model of regional planning that, in con-
trast to the view prevailing among its members at that time, was an 
agricultural rather than a general model, which meant that it could not 
serve as the basis for a general handbook. 
The author felt justified in pointing out that the team members, in using 
that model, had tended to overlook the non-agricultural economic sector's in 
the region while at the same time believing that they were in fact taking 
account of the entire economic structure; that they had confused their 
regional planning model with the true situation in the region; that as a 
result of their psychological approach — which, though in internal harmony, 
was at variance with reality — they had continued to neglect certain aspects 
of regional planning; and that at the time of the investigation they had not 
yet entirely abandoned their original approach in favour of one better suited 
to their aims. 
In the following study of scientific thinking some of the observations 
made at the time are included by way of illustration in the hope that the 
problem, which is dealt with in abstract terms will be appreciated more 
readily. The country, region and town concerned have been given fictitious 
names. 
The author wishes to express his gratitude to Professor R. A. J. van Lier, 
to whom he owes his appreciation of problems relating to the philosophy 
of science and who was his principal source of intellectual inspiration in 
working out and formulating the ideas presented in the following pages. 
He is also indebted to Professor A. T. M. Meyer for his experienced and 
tireless assistance aimed at enhancing the philosophical soundness of 
reasonings and concepts used, and to Dr. Niels G. Röling, whose 
penetrating comments were of value in clarifying various points in the text. 
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Introduction 
In the course of their professional lives some scientists change their ideas 
regarding one or more fundamental points, while others progress no further 
than on-going refinement of familiar data on the basis of the same un-
changing models. We have termed the scientific thinking of the former 
"original creativity", and that of the latter "derived creativity". * 
The assumption underlying the ideas presented in this study is that each 
of these two types of scientific creativity is accompanied by a specific 
psychological approach on the part of the scientist to his "world of expe-
rience", which term we use to indicate everything in his material, cultural 
and mental world to which he could direct his attention. 
The scientist's world of experience may be regarded as consisting of five 
qualitatively different elements, and his capacity for original creative 
scientific thought may be influenced either positively or negatively by the 
way in which he relates psychologically to each of those elements. 
Proceeding from these basic notions the study opens with an account of 
the theoretical background of our ideas and of the way in which our 
principal concepts were formed. Chapter II is devoted to a schema 
illustrating what we believe to be usual process of scientific perception, 
thinking, formulation, testing and modification, and to a second schema 
localising and defining the five elements of the scientist's world of experience 
and tracing their interrelationship. 
The next chapter deals with the concepts of "original creative scientific 
thinking" and "derived creative scientific thinking" in detail, and Chapter 
IV introduces four psychological concepts which enable us to show how 
the scientist relates to each of the five elements of his world of experience. 
The implications of this for both types of scientific creativity are discussed 
in Chapter V. The study concludes with a recapitulative typification of 
original and derived creative scientific thinking and an endeavour to fit 
our conclusions into a wider psychological context. 
* Exact definitions of the concepts of original and derived creative thinking are 
given on pp. 18, 19 and 20. A similar definition of the world of experience is to be 
found on p. 15. 
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f. The theoretical background of the conceptual 
framework 
As stated in the foregoing, we propose to present a framework of concepts 
in the form of a schema which we feel to be of value as a guideline for the 
examination and description of creativity in scientific thinking. In con-
structing the schema we were inspired primarily by Ogden and Richards' 
"The Meaning of Meaning" 2 and by Thomas Kuhn's "The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions". 3 In the course of the following discussion of the 
generalisations in both works which were of special interest to us, we shall 
explain our own terminology. 
LI. The first theoretical source: Ogden and Richards' symbol-thought-
referent triangle 
Ogden and Richards constructed a diagram 4 as a means of analysing the 
way in which symbols — largely words — influence thought: 
DIAGRAM 1 
Thought or Reference 
bol 
(an 
Referent 
stands for 
imputed relation) 
Their point of departure is a special type of thought, viz. thought concer-
ning the external world, or thought referring to something — a material 
matter, a fact, an event — outside ourselves, which they term "reference". 
That which the reference indicates is termed "the referent". The thinker 
expresses his thoughts about the outside world (his references) in symbols, 
either words or images. Thus the real meaning of a symbol is the thought 
which the thinker wishes to express by this means. Symbols symbolize, 
according to Ogden and Richards, thoughts and not the referents. They 
state that the relation between the symbol and referent is an indirect one, 
consisting of the thinker's opinion on how both are related to each other. 
Thus the symbol-referent relation is "an imputed relation". 5 
We have adapted to our purposes Ogden and Richards' symbol-thought-
referent triangle and incorporated it into our schema of scientific perception, 
thought, formulation, testing and modification. * As stated in the intro-
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auction, our general aim was to create a conceptual framework for a 
description of the way in which the scientist psychologically relates to 
everything coming to his attention. The referent in our schema is not simply 
the phenomenon to which a symbol used by him refers, but all phenomena 
presenting themselves to his notice as potential field of research; this we 
have termed "the external world". Comprising all physical, psychological 
and social phenomena coming to the attention of the scientist, the external 
world is thus his potential research area in the widest sense of the word and 
invariably includes the referents of the symbols he uses. ** 
We, too, have adopted thought concerning the external world — in this 
case that of the scientist, however — as our psychological point of departure. 
Following in the footsteps of Carl Steinbuch, who posits that any meaningful 
definition of thought must take its "model structure" into account,8 we 
assume that the scientist thinks of the external world in terms of a 
model of the structure of that external world which he carries in his head. 
We have termed this model the intrapsychic model of the external world, 
a term which may thus be regarded as a specification, for scientific thinking, 
of Ogden and Richards' "reference". 
The intrapsychic model of the external world consists of actual thinking 
itself, of a changing arsenal of thoughts and visual impressions of which the 
aspects formed in the past may vary from forgotten and half forgotten to 
full recollection, and the nascent aspects from still unaware to pre-
awareness and full awareness. The thinker will be able to convert some of 
these thoughts and impressions into words and images; others will be 
merely grasped intuitively or only vaguely perceived. 
The scientist can express his intrapsychic model, i.e. render it visible 
or audible to others, in the form of a body of symbols which we have 
termed his explicit model of the external world. This term, too, may be 
regarded as a specification, for the formulation of scientific ideas, of Ogden 
and Richards' general term "symbol". 
The first part of our model is shown in the following diagram: 
DIAGRAM 2 
Intrapsychic model 
of 
the external world 
External world Explicit model 
of the 
external world 
imputed relation 
* See pp. 14-16 for further elaboration of this schema. 
** The external world should not be confused with the world of experience. As we 
explain on p. 16, in our terminology the external world is one of five constituent 
elements of the world of experience. 
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The term "imputed relation" indicates, as in Ogden and Richards' triangle, 
that the thinker has formed a certain idea of the nature of the relation 
between his explicit model and the actual external world. 
1.2 The second theoretical source: Kuhn's paradigmatic historicism 
Our second source of scientific inspiration consisted of the principal con-
cepts and themes put forward by Thomas S. Kuhn in the study referred 
to above, in which he is concerned to trace the regularities underlying all 
scientific development, as viewed from the angle of the psychology and 
sociology of thinking. He is of the opinion that two types of science, which 
he terms "normal science" and "extraordinary science", have continually 
succeeded each other throughout the history of western science. 7 
"In this essay 'normal science' means research firmly based upon one or more past i 
scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community 
acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice. Today 
such achievements are recounted, though seldom in their original form, by science 
textbooks... (which) expound the body of accepted theory, illustrate many or all, of 
its successful applications, and compare these applications with exemplary observa-
tions and experiments. Before such books became popular early in the nineteenth 
century (and until even more recently in the newly matured sciences), many of the 
famous classics of science fulfilled a similar function. Aristotle's 'Physica'... New-
ton's 'Principia'... and many other works served for a time implicitly to define the 
legitimate problems and methods of a research field for succeeding generations of 
practitioners. They were able to do so because they shared two essential 
characteristics. Their achievement was sufficiently unprecedented to attract an 
enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity. 
Simultaneously, it was sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the 
redefined group of practitioners to resolve. 
Achievements that share these two characteristics I shall henceforth refer to as 
'paradigms', a term that relates closely to 'normal science'. By . . . it, I mean to 
suggest that some accepted examples of actual scientific practice — examples which 
include law, theory, application and instrumentation altogether — provide models 
from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research. These are the 
traditions which the historian describes under such rubrics as 'Ptolemaic astronomy' 
(or 'Copernican'), 'Aristotelian dynamics' (or 'Newtonian'), 'corpuscular optics' (or 
'wave optics'), and so on. The study of paradigms, including many that are far more 
specialized than those named illustratively above, is what prepares the student for 
membership in the particular scientific community with which he will later 
practice." 
Kuhn states that it is usual for normal science to be practised up to the 
point where one or more perspicacious scientists begin to realise that a 
particular observation or group of observations can never be explained 
within the framework of the existing paradigm. Thus driven by need, they 
will proceed to the type of research that Kuhn terms "extraordinary science" 
and that he describes as follows: 
First of all, he says, the scientist will push the rules of normal science 
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harder than ever to see, in the area of difficulty, just where and how far 
they can be made to work. If this does not succeed, he will pursue one or 
more of a number of courses. Led by his "intuition", he may begin trying 
random experiments in the hope that the results will provide him with a new 
theoretical route to the solution of his problem. And often, since no 
experiment can be conceived without some sort of theory, he will try to 
generate speculative theories, which process Kuhn terms "thought experi-
ments": 8 
" . . . the analytical thought experimentation that bulks so large in the writings of 
Galileo, Einstein, Bohr, and others is perfectly calculated to expose the old paradigm 
to existing knowledge in ways that isolate the root of crisis with a clarity unattainable 
in the laboratory." 
The practitioner of extraordinary science is thus constantly preoccupied 
with thoughts like "What if this or that were the case?". In such periods of 
crisis scientists will often turn to philisophy with a view to laying bare the 
philosophical assumptions underlying existing opinions and to replacing 
them with others wherever possible. If a new way of explaining the anomaly 
is found, this means that a scientific revolution has taken place and that a 
new paradigm to serve as the basis for a new series of finely-shaded insights 
has come into being.9 
Like Kuhn, we incline to the view that all essentially new scientific 
knowledge is gained through the replacement of certain current assumptions 
by others which prove to provide a more satisfactory explanation of the 
phenomena observed. We feel, however, that two aspects of his concise but 
comprehensive study require further comment. 
Kuhn's yardstick for classifying any particular aspect of scientific thought 
or research as "normal" or "extraordinary" is the paradigm concept, made 
up of both the scientific assumptions current in any given scientific 
community and the values and norms prevailing in that community, such 
as the experimental methods considered appropriate, the lines along which 
research is expected to be conducted, the requirements to which scientific 
theory must conform and the views held respecting the social desirability 
of research.10 We may conclude from this enumeration that for Kuhn the 
paradigm concept implies all those views, values and norms shared by a 
scientific community which stand in some relation to their scientific work 
and which they tend to accept as self-evident. But because he has 
incorporated in his concept a medley of theoretically different elements of 
knowledge, the question whether a piece of scientific work is normal or 
extraordinary will inevitably be decided in part by the personal preference 
of the investigator concerned. For if a scientist exchanges a certain 
assumption — one relating, say, to experiments — for another, while 
retaining the rest of the assumptions current in his scientific community, 
what criterion must then be used to determine whether he is practising 
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normal or extraordinary science?* By defining the term "paradigm" with 
a certain vagueness, i.e. in such a way that the meaning of the word fluc-
tuates in accordance with how it is used because the various aspects of the 
research subject indicated by the term change according to the context in 
which it is used, Kuhn has left himself considerable scope in which to label 
scientific work as normal or extraordinary. Though this has enabled him 
to produce a work which is at once easy to read and wide-ranging in its 
conclusions, the accuracy of his observations and deductions has been 
adversely affected in the process. 
The second point in Kuhn's work requiring comment is this. He tells us 
that philosophers of science are generally of the opinion that scientific 
development is cumulative, which is to say that new theories derive logically 
from their predecessors, and goes on to put forward his own opposing view 
that the development of science consists of a succession of qualitatively 
different paradigms, and consequently of paradigms possessing no logical 
affinity with one another. u Leaving aside the question of who is right here, 
it seems to us that a useful criterion for deciding whether a newly introduced 
theory represents scientific progress is whether or not it adds to the number 
of phenomena that may be regarded as being scientifically explained. 
This being the case, we propose to regard the introduction of a theory 
shedding new light not only on phenomena that have already been explained 
but also on a number of hitherto inexplicable phenomena as accumulation 
of scientific knowledge, irrespective of whether or not that new explanation 
is based on a scientific viewpoint qualitatively different from its predecessor. 
As stated in the introduction, the question at the heart of this study, viz. 
why it is that some scientists succeed in altering their ideas about essential 
points at least once in the course of their professional lives while others 
seem to get no further than a constant refinement of their knowledge 
deriving from the same unchanging model, is borrowed from Kuhn's 
analysis. We are thus concerned with the question of why some people 
prove to be capable of practising "extraordinary science" while others do 
not move beyond the practice of "normal science". In seeking the answer — 
necessarily highly incomplete — to this question we have followed Kuhn's 
example and adopted as a criterion for determining the degree of originality 
the extent to which scientists manage to free themselves from certain 
paradigmatic assumptions and to replace them with new assumptions 
which — and here we deviate from Kuhn's views — make it possible to 
amend essential points of existing models or to construct entirely new 
models in such a way that phenomena remaining inexplicable in terms of 
the old paradigm can henceforth also be explained. So as to be able to define 
* Kuhn is aware of this problem himself, for he refers repeatedly to "minor 
scientific revolutions", by which he means changes of insight whereby the more 
specialised scientist sheds his low-abstraction-level paradigm. The difficulty remains, 
however, that his terminology provides no clearly drawn guidelines for the way in 
which the investigator of scientific practice is to incorporate specific elements of 
knowledge into the paradigm concerned. 
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scientific thought unequivocally as normal or extraordinary science, our 
paradigm incorporates only philosophical and scientific assumptions and 
takes no account of normative factors and values judgments. This paradigm 
of exclusively cognitive elements may be set out as follows: 
DIAGRAM 3 
Epistemological and 
formally logical 
assumptions 
underlying 
specific scientific 
starting points 
relating to 
the object of research 
paradigm 
By "epistemological assumptions" we mean the views of the scientist under 
investigation concerning the way in which phenomena in the external world 
ultimately stand in relation to one another, e.g. causal, final, statistically 
co-variant, etc., in three- or multi-dimensional space and in absolute or 
relative time. 
"Formally logical assumptions" refers to the rules of logic which he follows 
in arriving at conclusions based on his observation, e.g. syllogisms, truth 
tables, and so on. * 
Together, these two types of assumption constitute the most abstract part 
of the scientists' paradigm. If we endow his paradigm with elements of 
knowledge at this level only, we necessarily find ourselves at the level of 
comparison between three dimensional and multi-dimensional geometrical 
systems, between Newtonian and Einsteinian physics and between causal 
and final interpretations in the biological and behavioural sciences. 
Most scientific thinking, however, is carried out within the confines of 
certain scientific points of departure as regards the research subject, within 
a certain scientific trend or "tradition", as Kuhn terms it. Examples of what 
we mean here are the psycho-analytical, behaviourist and Gestalt starting 
points in psychology, the social action and social systems concepts in 
sociology and precisely formulated comparisons such as Newton's Laws and 
Einstein's explanations of gravitational attractions, used in classic and 
modern mechanics, respectively, as basic comparisons. These scientific 
* The epistemological and formally logical assumptions, as we define them, are 
derived from the two fields of philosophy usually referred to as "epistemology" (or 
"the theory of knowledge") and "formal logics". 
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traditions may in turn contain various schools of thought differing — 
within the bounds indicated above — one from the other on the more 
detailed points of departure, for example, the Neo-Freudian schools in 
psychoanalytic psychiatry. 
The scientific starting points and philosophical assumptions incorporated 
in the paradigm are referred to collectively, where this is deemed necessary, 
as postulates. 
Our definition of paradigms makes it possible for the investigator of 
scientific thinking to determine for himself the level of abstraction forming 
a dividing line between normal science and extraordinary science, for it 
leaves him entirely free to endow paradigms with specific, scientific, 
epistemological and formally logical postulates at his own discretion.12 
After this brief account of the way in which our terminology stems from 
two theoretical sources, we can now proceed to a more detailed description 
of our schema, which is ultimately intended to constitute a guideline for 
discussion of original and derived creative scientific thought. 
12 (898) 
ff. Formation of the intrapsychic model 
The hub of the following discussion is the question of the way in which 
scientists construct their intrapsychic model of the external world. * If we 
examine the process of scientific observation, thought, formulation, testing 
and modification which, in our view, all scientists pass through either wholly 
or partially in the development of their scientific ideas, we come up against 
the principal (cognitive and perceptual) sources from which they can derive 
information for the construction of their intrapsychic models. 
II. 1 Schema of scientific observation, thought, formulation, testing and 
modification 
Elucidation 
The schema consists of elements, or things towards which the scientist can 
direct his thinking and observation (shown in rectangles) and stages of 
thought, or the deriving of information from the preceding element and the 
conversion of that information into an aspect of the following element 
(indicated by arrows). We have termed stages of thought which are not 
explicitly formulated intrapsychic, in contrast to explicit stages of thought 
expressed in words and images. The word deduction refers to the inference 
of a more detailed structure from a less complex element, and induc-
tion to the building up of an idea or a model on the basis of observed fact. 
It will scarcely be necessary to add that "intrapsychic" should not be 
confused with "unconscious", the former referring to inner processes which 
may be either conscious or unconscious. 
As the schema shows, the scientist constructs his intrapsychic model 
from various sources. There is first and foremost the external world ** 
from which he derives his visual and auditive impressions. From his 
intrapsychic paradigm he derives, consciously, or unconsciously, the 
epistemological, formally logical and specific scientific postulates on which 
* The intrapsychic model may in itself be something to reflect upon. 
** Defined on p. 8. 
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DIAGRAM 4 
Intrapsychic 
epistemological and 
formally logical 
assumptions 
underlying 
Intrapsychic 
specific scientific 
starting points relating 
to the object of research 
Intrapsychic 
paradigm 
Intrapsychic 
derivation Other 
symbolic 
structures 
applied as analagous 
to the external world 
Intrapsychic 
model of the 
external world 
• t < J 
intrapsychic 
explicit model of 
the external world 
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he wishes to base his substantive knowledge (if he is aware of his presup-
positions) or is constrained to base it (if he is not aware of his presup-
positions). And, finally, he derives certain insights from his other symbolic 
structures (his cultural environment, consisting of scientific theories, works 
of art, philosophical systems, etc.). 
After thus drawing upon the external world, his own paradigm and other 
symbolic structures, the scientist moulds suitable aspects of his intrapsychic 
model into an explicit model of the external world, from which he can then 
deduce certain explicit hypotheses relating to the external world. The latter 
can be assayed against the external world itself, and the test results thus 
obtained used to modify both his intrapsychic model and his explicit model. 
Such a modified explicit model can stimulate further thought and thus set 
in motion a new cycle of observation, thought, formulation and testing. 
Some remarks 
The schema set out above describes scientific thinking in which the 
paradigmatic postulates are not explicitly formulated by the thinker, a type 
of scientific thinking which, in our opinion, is frequently encountered. For 
this reason we have incorporated only the intrapsychic variant of the 
paradigm followed. Should the thinker set about formulating his postulates 
explicitly, he could embody those postulates of his intrapsychic paradigm 
which he is able to perceive into an explicit paradigm which, if his reasoning 
is logical and consistent, should incorporate all the postulates underlying his 
explicit model. 
Though scientists are concerned to render intrapsychic ideas explicit, it 
should not be concluded from this that the most ideal kind of scientific 
thought would be one in which all the elements of our schema — with the 
exception, of course, of the external world — could be explicitly formulated. 
If this were so, the development of new ideas would be impossible because 
all creative activity includes a stage in which the ideas concerned are 
nascent and thus (still) inexpressible. 
II.2 The relation pattern of the intrapsychic model and the world of 
experience 
In our schema the intrapsychic model stands in direct relation to five other 
elements, if we consider the explicit hypotheses to belong to the explicit 
model itself. These five elements will be referred to in the following pages 
under the collective term of the scientist's world of experience, for each of 
these elements contributes something to his intrapsychic model. 
Since we propose to analyse scientific thought and observation with the 
aid of these five relationships, the focal point of the schema is for our 
purposes the relation pattern of the intrapsychic model and the five 
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elements making up the world of experience, which may be shown as 
follows: 
DIAGRAM 5 
In this instance the lines no longer indicate the deriving and conversion of 
information, but show the relation established by the thinker/observer 
between his intrapsychic model and an element in his world of experience 
or the way in which he interprets that element. 
The term "imputed relation" under the interrupted line refers, as before, 
to the relation established by the thinker/observer between his explicit 
model and the external world. We shall see that the degree to which he is 
aware of an essential difference between the two is of influence on his 
ability to be originally creative as a scientist. 
We would emphasize the fact that our schema is built up exclusively of 
cognitive and perceptual elements of knowledge and consciousness, with the 
exception, of course, of the "external world" concept. This was decided 
upon with the object of creating a framework of concepts harmonising as 
closely as possible with one another, to which end Kuhn's comprehensive 
but vague conceptual framework was exchanged for one which covers a 
much smaller area of the subject under investigation but which is more 
precisely defined. Broadly speaking, our research field consists of the 
elements of the scientist's world of experience which we surmise to be 
capable of exercising a certain influence on his capacity for creative 
scientific thought. Besides cognitive elements, his world of experience may 
include the code of ethics to which he adheres, his religious and political 
beliefs, his specific personal and scientific problems, the system of norms 
and values observed in his environment, and so on. Without wishing to 
make light of the influence that all such factors may have on the develop-
ment of scientific thinking, we shall leave them out of consideration for the 
time being in the interests of the logical consistency of our schema. 
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The following chapters, III and IV, will be devoted to a further 
elaboration of our conceptual framework, after which we shall proceed to a 
discussion of the nature of the relation pattern introduced above as regards 
both original and derived creative thinking. 
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fff. Some additional concepts 
III. 1 Scientific models 
We would define a scientific model as a combination of variables abstracted 
from the external world or mentally conceived as being pertinent to that 
external world that proves to be effective as a means of describing or 
explaining certain phenomena in the external world, while other phenomena 
prove to be either incompatible with it or irrelevant. 
The practice of science is directed, in our view, towards a continuing 
process involving the creation of new models and the modification of 
fundamental parts of existing models with a view to describing or explaining 
as well those phenomena that were previously incompatible with, or irre-
levant to, those models. 
III.2 Original and derived creative scientific thinking 
Starting from the above view of what constitutes a scientific model and its 
development, we now come to a more precise definition of original and 
derived creativity than that given at the beginning of this study. 
Obviously the "originality" of any given scientific idea will depend on the 
scientific criterion used to assess it. Our schema permits us to select such 
a criterion at three levels: 
— the level of the epistemological and/or formally logical assumptions; 
— the level of the specific scientific starting points relating to the object of 
research; 
— the level of the explicit model of the external world (not the level of 
the intrapsychic model of the external world because here we are seeking 
a criterion for describing the degree of originality of this intrapsychic 
model itself which therefore can hardly be used as a criterion). 
As a continuation of this line of thought, we give the following general 
definitions of original and derived creative scientific thinking: 
Orginal creative scientific thinking 
= a mode of thinking about the external world whereby a scientist arrives 
at a new insight — at a level of abstraction fixed as criterion by some-
one else — allowing for developing new models of the external world, 
which are capable of explaining, besides phenomena already accounted 
for, also phenomena incompatible with models based on his former 
insights. 
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Derived creative scientific thinking 
= a mode of thinking about the external world whereby scientist proceeds 
no further than refining existing insights at a level fixed as criterion by 
someone else. 
These defenitions permit us to make a clear distinction between model-
based, paradigmatic, epistemological and formally-logical original creative 
thinking, and between the corresponding levels of derived creative thinking. 
For the sake of clarity, the word "paradigmatic" is used here to indicate 
original and derived creative thinking at the level of specific scientific 
starting points, a description, it may be added, which is possible only if the 
investigator of scientific thinking endows "specific scientific starting points" 
with certain elements of knowledge. 
Our "paradigmatic original creative thinking" corresponds to Kuhn's 
"extraordinary science", and our "paradigmatic derived creative thinking" 
to his "normal science". 
Our conceptual specification of original and derived creativity may be 
illustrated by means of an example drawn from the development of econo-
mic theory. In replacing the classic macro- economics supply model by his 
macro-economics demand model, Keynes displayed model-based original 
creativity". However, observing that Keynes followed classic economics by 
adapting the concept "homo economicus" (= rationally calculating, maxi-
mum-profit-oriented man) as his main scientific starting point, we could be 
obliged to call his thinking "paradigmatic derived". 
An economist replacing this model of "homo economicus" by a new 
model of economic activity better adapted to the reality of man's economic 
behaviour would then have to be described in terms of "paradigmatic 
original creativity", while his thinking would remain to fall into the category 
of "epistemological and formally logical derived creativity". If an economist 
were to exchange the syllogism as a formal means of arriving at conclusions 
for something else, his thinking could be characterised as "formally logical 
original creativity". 
If we are to refer unequivocally to original and derived creativity within 
the framework of our schema, then we, too, must fix a certain level as our 
criterion. We have therefore settled upon the lowest possible level, that of 
the explicit model, as being the most suitable. In the interests of clarity, the 
terms accompanying this level are defined as "model-based original creative 
scientific thinking" and "model-based derived creative scientific thinking". 
Model-based original creative scientific thinking constitutes a mode of 
thinking about the external world in which scientists working from a given 
paradigm reach new insights allowing for the construction of either an 
entirely new model or the redefinition of the essential variables of an 
existing model in a way permitting various phenomena that were hitherto 
incompatible with that model or were considered to be irrelevant also to be 
described or explained. 
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Model-based derived creative scientific thinking constitutes a mode of 
thinking about the external world in which scientists add refinements to the 
essential structure of their models while anomalies either remain un-
explained or can be accounted for only with the aid of ad hoc hypotheses 
or correction factors. 
In defining and describing original creative scientific thinking we have 
tacitly observed the rule that use of the term "original" at a particular level 
implies that the person concerned continues to think in a derived creative 
manner at the level immediately above. The creativity of the model-based 
original creative thinker remains paradigmatically-derived, while the 
creativity of the paradigmatically original creative thinker remains episte-
mologkally and formal-logically derived. 
In the interests of a simpler method of communication we shall loosen 
the reins of terminological precision by employing the term "original", in 
accordance with our choice of the explicit model as the criterion level, in 
the sense of all elements of knowledge displaying a logical incompatibility 
with the explicit model used by the thinker (and which at the same time 
seem to facilitate the development of ideas of a greater explanatory value). 
The question of the level to which this originality reaches — the 
paradigmatic or even the epistomological level — will not be discussed 
here. Where it is necessary to use the term without the risk of ambiguity, 
we shall do so with the aid of the terminology introduced in this section. 
ni.3 Two types of intrapsychic model 
On the basis of what we have just stated regarding the use of the term 
"original", we can now distinguish between two types of intrapsychic model 
which may be found among scientists at a given moment: one from which 
an original creative conversion of the explicit model is possible, and one 
from which only derived creative refinement can stem. 
The original intrapsychic model 
= an intrapsychic model which differs in such a way from the explicit 
model, that it enables the scientist to perceive in his world of experience 
as well aspects which are logically consistent with his explicit model 
as ones which are logically inconsistent with it. 
The derived intrapsychic model 
= an intrapsychic model which is identical with the explicit model and 
which enables the scientist to perceive in his world of experience only 
those aspects which are logically consistent with his explicit model. 
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IV. Four mental mechanisms at variance with 
original creativity 
We believe that a number of mental mechanisms may be found in the five 
relations between the intrapsychic model and the world of experience which 
imply derived creative thinking. They are derived assimilation, derived 
perceptivity, totalization and reification. 
IV. 1 Derived assimilation 
On the analogy of Piaget, we have defined "assimilation"13 as: 
— interpretation by the scientist of aspects of his world of experience in a 
way permitting them to be fitted into his intrapsychic model. 
As we have taken it as axiomatic that scientists always interpret in terms 
of an intrapsychic model, it follows from this definition of assimilation that 
all scientific interpretation is a form of assimilation. In accordance with our 
distinction between original and derived creative scientific thinking, two 
types of assimilation may be distinguished: 
Original assimilation 
= assimilation occurring on the basis of an original intrapsychic model. 
Derived assimilation 
= assimilation occurring on the basis of a derived intrapsychic model 
Derived assimilation may be directed as much towards aspects of the world 
of experience that are logically compatible with the explicit model — in 
which case the perceiver can assimilate them without difficulty — as towards 
those that are not logically compatible with the explicit model. These 
conflicting aspects can be dealt with by the scientist in various ways, as 
Abelson has described.u He can simply deny their existence, or regard 
them as inexplicable exceptions or as phenomena that can only be explained 
by means of other scientific theories. If the conflicting aspects belong to the 
external world, he can try to fit them into his explicit model with the aid of 
ad hoc hypotheses, correction factors, and so on. What these non-objective 
approaches have in common, however, is that the basic structure of an, as 
to the external world, inadequate model, remains unchanged. 
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IV.2 Derived perceptivity 
The assimilation of impressions is preceded by observation. In view of the 
fact that the word "observation" is generally used only in connection with 
physical objects, while we are dealing with the scientist's world of experience 
— which contains both material and non-material elements —we have 
substituted "perception' for "observation". 
In accordance with our concepts of original and derived assimilation, a 
simple type of perceptivity may be defined as a tendency on the part of the 
scientist to perceive aspects of his world of experience which are logically 
compatible with his intrapsychic model and to ignore others. 
Original perceptivity 
= perceptivity for aspects of the world of experience, regardless of whether 
they are logically compatible or incompatible with the explicit model, 
based on an original intrapsychic model. 
Derived perceptivity 
= perceptivity for only those aspects of the world of experience which are 
logically compatible with the explicit model, based on a derived 
intrapsychic model. 
Derived perceptivity is accompanied by 
Derived inattention 
= inattention for aspects of the world of experience which are logically 
incompatible with the explit model, based on a derived intrapsychic 
model. 
By the same token, original perceptivity is accompanied by original in-
attention in that the original creative thinker also tends not to perceive 
aspects that are inconsistent with his intrapsychic model. If, as we shall later 
consider, the thinker possesses the capacity to subject his intrapsychic model 
to a critical scrutiny, he is bound to notice certain aspects of that inattention 
at a certain moment. Because of the terminological confusion to which it 
could give rise, however, no further reference will be made to original 
inattention. 
Field of perceptivity 
In our model perceptivity is focused on the world of experience, divided 
into five elements. The three following terms enable us to refer with greater 
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clarity to what the scientist tends to perceive in his world of experience and 
what he tends to overlook. 
Field of vision 
= all aspects of an element of the scientist's world of experience which 
present themselves to his attention. 
Field of perceptivity 
— those aspects of an element of the scientist's world of experience, which 
he tends to actually perceive, when they present themselves to his 
attention. 
Field of inattention 
= those aspects of an element which the scientist tends to disregard; that 
is to say, those aspects which he can easily overlook when they present 
themselves to his attention. 
The fields of perceptivity and inattention together constitute the field of 
vision, as is clear from the definitions. 
It could be argued that all observation, being human, shares certain 
basic characteristics which are governed by certain laws imposed on all 
observers by the sheer fact of their being human15. It could further be argued 
that, precisely because these basic characteristics are common to all 
mankind, we are entirely or almost entirely unaware of them, with the 
consequence that they are undetectable by scientific research. That being the 
case, the term "field of perceptivity" could be said to be too comprehensive 
for the reason that, although it is intended to indicate what some people 
perceive and what others fail to perceive in their world of experience, there 
is little point in using it to draw attention to that which is common to all 
perception and which furthermore lends itself with the utmost difficulty to 
scientific study and precise definition. To reduce this problem to manageable 
proportions for the research worker, Van LierX6 has worked out the 
following typology of human perception: 
Subject-determined perception 
= all aspects of perception determined by the perceiver as a human being. 
Van Lier gives an ideal-typical description of subject-determined perception, 
characterising it as consisting of two layers, one evading scientific investi-
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as an aspect of the other (All human interaction is communication), and 
soon. 
In our model reification may also concern the aspects of other symbolic 
structures symbolising the external world. Regarding the percepts (visual 
impressions) in the intrapsychic model and the aspects of paradigms 
relating tot the external world, such as the presumptions of time, three-
dimensional space and causality, as really existing in the external world may 
be classified equally well as reification. 
The problem of reification is an extremely difficult one because even 
though we may become aware of a specific act of reification, we are still 
left with the problem of reification of a more general nature as it is 
expressed in concepts like "thing", "existence", and so on. We then find 
ourselves dealing with problems of a philosophical nature which fall out-
side the scope of the present study. 
IV.5 Interference between the mechanisms 
Our four mental mechanisms may operate in groups of two or more, thus 
strengthening the scientist's distorted image of some particular aspect of his 
world of experience. We do not propose to apply all the possible combina-
tions of mechanisms to each of the five relations in the model, but shall 
restrict our attention (in the form of an example) to the joint occurrence 
of the four mechanisms where an aspect of the external world is perceived 
on the basis of a given explicit model. 
Let us assume that a sociologist analyses village communities with the 
aid of the well-known sociological model of "Gemeinschaft". 
— Derived assimilation will occur if he interprets all the phenomena he 
perceives in a community studied in such a way that they can be fitted 
into the "Gemeinschaft" model. 
— This will imply derived perceptivity for the phenomena which are 
compatible with the "Gemeinschaft" model and derived inattention for 
some of the phenomena which are incompatible with the model; the 
remaining phenomena of the latter type will be adapted to fit the model 
by means of mechanisms which we have not expressly defined as such. 
— Totalization will occur if he believes that all aspects of the village 
community are represented in the "Gemeinschaft" model. 
— Reification will occur if he thinks the village communities he is studying 
are indeed "Gemeinschaften", that is to say, if he thinks the concepts of 
"village community" and "community" do not indicate, but actually 
are, identical elements existing in the external world. 
The sequence in which the various mechanisms interfere is of little interest 
since the effect is the same in all cases, namely that our sociologist will 
henceforth associate all villages with "Gemeinschaft", and that will be that. 
It should be noted in this context that observing a village — which 
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includes people in interaction with one another, houses, plots of land and a 
host of other things — in terms of the concept of "village community" may 
in itself constitute an instance of derived assimilation followed by totaliza-
tion and reification. 
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V. The five relations of the intrapsychic model-
world of experience relation pattern 
As a general introductory remark, it may be stated that original creativity 
seems to be possible only if the intrapsychic model is an open one, i.e. if the 
scientist is capable of abstracting aspects of the five elements of his world 
of experience and incorporating them as qualitatively new aspects in his 
intrapsychic model so as to effect fundamental changes in the explicit model 
or to formulate a new one. 
Derived creative scientific thinking seems to be inevitable if the intra-
psychic model is a closed one, i.e. if the scientist is not capable of in-
corporating qualitatively new aspects derived from the elements of his world 
of experience into his intrapsychic model. 
The above two statements foreshadow the logical structure of the 
following pages. In discussing the relation of the intrapsychic model with 
the world of experience, we shall endeavour to indicate the factors which 
seem to constitute a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for original 
creative thinking (thereby employing the term "seem to make possible"), 
and the factors which seem to constitute a sufficient, but not necessary, 
condition for derived creative thinking (thereby employing the term 
"seem to imply"). 
V.l The intrapsychic model — explicit model relation 
The way in which the scientist relates to his explicit model (which we 
postulate throughout this study as being already in existence) is of essential 
importance. 
He will possess the capacity for original creative scientific thinking if he 
is capable of perceiving his own explicit model as a separate element of his 
world of experience differing from his intrapsychic model in that the latter 
contains a number of conscious or halfconscious aspects that are quali-
tatively at variance with the fundamental variables of the explicit model 
and can be formulated explicitly. 
Derived creative scientific thinking seems likely if the scientist does not 
perceive his explicit model as something objective, with basic characteristics 
admitting of argument, but as being identical to what he sees as a number 
of natural and self-evident stages of thought. In such cases there is no 
longer any difference between his present thinking and the effects of his 
former thinking. The explicit model and the intrapsychic model have 
become identical, which can only result in the carrying out of deductive 
refinements within the explicit model. 
Logically speaking, this means that the intrapsychic model has become 
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just as closed as the explicit model, and this we have termed a "thought 
circuit". 
A thought circuit 
= an intrapsychic model consisting of a closed system of constantly 
repeated thoughts identical to the explicit model deployed, outside of 
which the thinker does not move in his thinking about the external 
world and which he does not subject to critical scrutiny. 
There are a number of circumstances in which flexible thinking may rigidify 
and become a thought circuit. 
a. Memorising models which are difficult to understand 
Models, as theoretical structures, are not always easy to understand, and 
many people never succeed in grasping the full value of the models they 
use. Through their repeated attempts to understand them, however, they 
manage to incorporate the internal logic of the models as a matter of habit 
into their line of reasoning. Most of us undergo this process in the study of 
mathematics. Though we may never master the essentials of limits and 
integrals, if we use these concepts long enough, the stages of thought in-
volved nevertheless fix themselves in our minds, even if only as a habit. We 
may even be able to explain them to others, while not understanding them 
ourselves. 
b. Force of habit 
But even though the scientist may understand the model he is working 
with he may still slip into a kind of thought automatism. Everything in the 
model is logical and explicable, and after a time he is thoroughly familiar 
with it. If he does not realise that he is slipping into a habit of thought it 
will not be long before he is caught up in a thought circuit. 
c. Irrational attachment to a model 
Scientists may cling stubbornly to certain modes of thought for all manner 
of non-scientific reasons, such as faith in a great scientist, the wish to justify 
their social position by means of a model or the unconscious desire to 
rationalise suppressed emotions. 
The major difficulty with thought circuits is, in our opinion, that the 
person concerned is often not aware of the fact that he is thinking in this 
way. If a scientist who is trying to solve a scientific problem continually 
reaches a deadlock at the same point and makes no effort to analyse his 
habits of thought in the belief that his thinking is untrammelled, his thought 
processes will remain confined to the same channels and he will never 
discover what it is that he is doing. The problem thus remains insoluble. 
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We shall now consider how the mental mechanisms in the relation 
between the intrapsychic model and the explicit model can affect the 
creativity of thought. 
a. Derived perceptivity and] the explicit model 
Perceptivity for the explicit model may be more readily understood if 
considered together with the relation between the intrapsychic model and 
other symbolic structures. It should be borne in mind that there is a 
difference between a scientific model as it is used by the average scientist 
and a model as it can be formulated in extenso. 
An explicit model in the narrow sense 
— the formulation of a model of the external world in which the variables 
are simply defined and described in their interrelationship. 
An explicit model in the broader sense 
= the formulation of a model of the external world in which the variables 
are extensively defined and described in their interrelationship and in 
which the assumptions underlying the model are formulated up to the 
fundamental axiomatic level. 
It will often be the case that the explicit model in the broader sense is to 
a large extent part of the "other symbolic structures" element of the 
scientist's world of experience. Proceeding from that model in its entirety 
he borrows the aspects that are suitable for research of a comparatively 
low level of abstraction, which aspects will correspond with the explicit 
model in the narrow sense. The scientist's explicit model will then be 
consistent with his field of perceptivity as regards the "other symbolic 
structures" element. This means that precisely those aspects of the model 
that could indicate its problematical nature, viz. the assumptions on which 
it is based, remain in his field of inattention, which thus consists (in "other 
symbolic structures") of the very elements of knowledge that he could use, 
if he were aware of them, for an originally creative conversion of his model. 
It follows logically from the above that the next step for the scientist is 
to incorporate this explicit model in the narrow sense as a thought circuit 
in his intrapsychic model. For he has not perceived the problematical aspects 
of the model, which thus seems to him to constitute a self-evident structure 
for describing the external world. 
b. Totalization of the explicit model 
This heading is in reality a compressed description of a mental process in 
which two stages may be distinguished. For in accordance with our defini-
tion of totalization, the scientist first embodies the explicit model in its 
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entirety in his intrapsychic model and then proceeds to the tolalization of 
the latter. For convenience's sake, however, we shall continue to refer to the 
totalization of explicit models. 
An example of this process is the economist who thinks that the "homo 
economicus" is the definitive model of man, or the psycho-analyst who 
thinks that all human behaviour can be explained in terms of Freud's model 
of the human psyche. This kind of mistaken belief can impede an original 
creative approach to research, for the scientist who totalizes an explicit 
model of the external world thinks that with the aid of this model he is 
devoting attention to all important aspects of the external world, while in 
fact he subjects only a few of them to examination. If the disregarded 
aspects are of essential importance for gaining real insight into the subject 
under investigation, he will never succeed in doing so without changing his 
avenue of approach. Acting in the belief that he is investigating the whole 
of the subject, he is unaware of the fact that he is consistently overlooking 
something and consequently feels no need to consult others from time to 
time. 
The occurrence of totalization in scientific discussions amounts to a 
group instance of such a delusion. Certain aspects of the external world are 
left out of consideration without the speakers themselves being aware of it, 
and they can talk indefinitely without ever managing to surmount the barrier 
barring their way. 
An example of the totalization of an explicit model 
Before the Agricultural University team referred to in the preface could 
begin their exercise in regional planning, a suitable region in the tropics 
had to be found. Two members went on a reconnaissance mission to 
the country named Tangan and in a report compiled they warmly recom-
mended the Eastern Region with its capital of Tempat, containing 25 per 
cent of the population, as a suitable area for the projected regional plan-
ning. The report stated: 
"Agriculture is the principal means of subsistence but there is sufficient 
diversification to make regional planning worthwhile. Some of the 
problems to be expected will be outlined in the following pages." 
Of the six problems listed in the report, five were of a specifically agricul-
tural nature, while the sixth was no more than a general reference to 
employment and investment calculations per economic sector. 
From this and other points we have concluded that the writers of the 
report worked from an explicit model of regional planning consisting largely 
of plans and policy measures for the agricultural sector, a model which 
they themselves regarded, however, as a general regional planning model. 
Thus they totalized their explicit model of agricultural planning for the 
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Eastern Region into planning as such for the Eastern Region and called 
it regional planning. 
c. Reification of the explicit model 
In the practice of science reification does not always seem to occur in the 
extreme form in which we have defined it as a concept, i.e. regarding 
symbolic structures of the external world as really existing in the external 
world. It is more likely to be a constant jumbling up of the explicit model 
and the external world in the scientist's thoughts and in his expression of 
those thoughts. In referring to his model he shifts his ground imperceptibly 
to the external world, and in referring to the latter he tends to formulate 
exclusively within the framework of his explicit model. There is nothing 
wrong with this, provided he is fully aware of the fact that he is no longer 
referring to the external world alone. 
An example of the reification of an explicit model 
The problem of the jumbling up of the model and the external world for 
which the model was constructed emerges clearly from the following 
extract from an interview with a member of the team. 
Team member: 
"I feel that we made the region consistent with the nature of the team 
and simply eliminated everything that didn't fit. We made a model region, 
as it were... the team existed before we found a region, which of course 
didn't match the model. . . . so then various things that couldn't be 
brought into line with the model were eliminated altogether." 
Interviewer: 
"What things do you mean?" 
Team member: 
"Well, the role of the town, Tempat. What is in fact of the greatest im-
portance in the region was simply ignored for quite a long time by a 
considerable part of the team... they talked on and on about agricultural 
problems . . . but the capital, Tempat, was given no attention at all 
because the team was not prepared to deal with it." 
So in the opinion of this member of the team, the region was exchanged for 
the model and the team went ahead in the belief that they were observing 
the region. 
V.2 The intrapsychic model - external world relation 
The mentality from which the scientist perceives the external world is one of 
the factors determining the degree of original creativity he will develop in 
his thinking. If he is capable of perceiving aspects of the external world 
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which are at variance with his model or which present the latter in a new 
light and of making the intrapsychic induction required to convert those 
aspects into qualitatively new aspects of his explicit model, this will promote 
original creativity. Original creativity is impeded if the scientist perceives 
the external world on the basis of his explicit model and thus in effect per-
ceives only those aspects which are compatible with his model, either 
ignoring the others or interpreting them as unimportant or atypical. In 
psycho-analytical terms, his perception is based on projection. 
Scientific observation aimed at the construction of explicit models of the 
external world rests largely on abstraction. The scientist extracts certain 
aspects of the external world and studies them in their interrelationship. 
This abstraction is deliberate, for it leaves him free to become absorbed 
in a particular conceptual framework within which he can build up a 
thought system undisturbed by anything else coming to his attention. The 
price he pays, however, is that it is subsequently impossible for him to 
extend his knowledge of the external world beyond those boundaries. 
Through his constant preoccupation with just a few aspects abstracted from 
the external world he tends to concentrate his observation of the external 
world on those particular aspects and to disregard the others. 
Pursuing this train of thought to its logical conclusion, we may thus 
assume that the scientist will tend to concentrate his attention on those as-
pects of the external world which form part of his own discipline, which 
means that his field of perceptivity tends to be consistent with his own 
branch of science. We may also assume that he will be less keen in his 
observation of that part of the external world which is not connected with 
his own field of activity. His field of inattention will thus tend to correspond 
to those branches of science which are not his own. 
This phenomenon of selective scientific perception has important impli-
cations for scientific discussion which may be summed up in the following 
thesis: scientific discussion of the external world will not move beyond the 
shared field of perceptivity of the participants. 
An example of derived perceptivity for the external world 
In a letter written prior to their report the two team members sent out on 
reconnaissance made the following references to the suitability of the 
Eastern Region [italics supplied by author]: 
"Acting partly on local advice, we soon focused our attention on the 
Eastern Region. This area, which is readily accessible, surrounds Tempat, 
the administrative centre, and the data available for it are much more 
numerous than for any other area". 
"It presents interesting problems from the points of view of sociology, 
land tenure and agronomics, and land development and soil science. The 
main problem is the switching over from the "ladang" method to per-
manent cultivation and the question of land rights." 
"In a number of discussions held at the weekend we came to the 
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conclusion that the area surrounding Tempat, the Eastern Region, would 
probably meet the team's exacting requirements better than any other." 
From the words italized we have concluded that the writers in all likeli-
hood perceived the Eastern Region as the-area-around-Tempat, or in other 
words as a geographical area with a hole in the middle. As the second 
extract shows, they were preoccupied with the agricultural aspects of the 
project. We feel that this, together with the first example, justifies the 
conclusion that the members of the mission worked from a derived intrap-
sychic model of (agricultural) regional planning, from which they perceived 
the region in a derived manner involving the rural areas as their field of 
perceptivity and the urban area, the town, as their field of inattention. 
The statement that "the area surrounding Tempat would probably meet 
the team's exacting requirements better than any other" supports our thesis 
that scientific discussion will not go beyond the bounds of the shared 
field of perceptivity of the participants. 
V.3 The intrapsychic model - intrapsychic paradigm relation 
To discuss original and derived creative science at the level of paradigms 
we are obliged to refer once again to the distinction made in Chapter III.2 
between model-based, paradigmatic, epistemological and formally logical 
original and derived creative thought. 
Paradigmatic original creative science can be practised if the scientist 
knows on what paradigmatic — i.e. specific scientific — points of departure 
his intrapsychic model is based, and is capable of working out other starting 
points for modifying his model or replacing it by another. 
Paradigmatic derived creative science becomes likely when the scientist is 
unable to develop specific scientific starting points other than those he 
already uses. 
The same applies in respect of original and derived creative science at 
the epistemological and formally logical level. 
It may be posited that the fewer the postulates included in the paradigm 
by the investigator of scientific thinking, i.e. the more abstract the formu-
lation of the paradigm, the greater will be the originality of the scientist who 
replaces one or more of those postulates by others with a wider explanatory 
range. True scientific "revolutionaries", in Kuhn's terminology, are people 
like Gauss, the mathematican who upset the postulate of three dimensiona-
lity in geometry and replaced it by another, and Einstein, who did the 
same in physics with the postulate of the continuous time scale. 
The way in which the scientist whose thinking is of the paradigmatic 
derived creative kind relates to his own postulates may vary considerably. 
He may be unaware of them, believing that the essential variables of his 
model are based on "natural" thinking which requires no further investiga-
tion; or he may be aware of them and accept them as dogma established by 
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an eminent philosopher or scientist, to be used indiscriminately as a basis 
for all scientific thinking about the external world. It will frequently be the 
case that he is more or less aware of them, but lacks the insight required 
to change or modify them. 
V.4 The intrapsychic model — test results relation 
Test results actually are not a separate element of the world of experience, 
being in fact nothing more than an answer to the question of how certain 
points of the explicit model relate to the external world. 
They enable the scientist to trace with greater precision the imputed rela-
tion between the explicit model and the external world. 
Kuhn17 points out that the way the scientist interprets the results of his 
tests is closely connected with his mental preoccupations. In the absence 
of a better model the practitioners of "normal science" are strongly inclined, 
he says, to interpret all research findings in terms of the existing model. 
When they encounter anomalies they will either try to „explain" them with 
the aid of ad hoc hypotheses or correction factors or will regard them as 
irrelevant and explicable solely within the context of some other branch of 
science, or as exceptional cases, and so on. The practitioners of "extra-
ordinary science", on the other hand, are capable of evaluating the merits 
of anomalies and of constructing models which help to explain them. 
So test results that are inconsistent with the expectations of the practitio-
ner of normal science are very often assimilated in a derived creative way, 
while original assimilation is the exception rather than the rule. 
Kuhn states in his analysis of the history of Western physics and 
chemistry that the scientific community often believed that anomalies had 
been fully explained with the aid of ad hoc hypotheses or correction factors 
before an originally creative scientist introduced a qualitatively different 
model showing that they were wrong. 
A derived creative approach to test results will consequently quite often 
result in a refined model from which both the scientist concerned and 
others conclude that the problem has been solved. 
V.5 The intrapsychic model — other symbolic structures relation 
Donald Schon18 has stated that new models of the external world come 
into being in the following way. The scientist first approaches the field of 
study with a model that is already known but has never been used in this 
way before, thus projecting an existing framework of concepts and relations 
on a part of the external world in an original way and thereby saying in 
effect, "Let's look at it from this angle". He is now in a position to view 
the situation in a new light. The model reveals hitherto unsuspected aspects 
of the situation and armed with his new knowledge the scientist is in a 
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position to view the model, too. in a new light. The model's unsuspected 
possibilities open up the way, for instance, for redefinition of the variables. 
After a time the scientist will be able to modify the model in such a way 
that it can incorporate new basic variables, and a new piece of knowledge 
comes into being. 
In his argument based primarily on the premise that all new ideas are 
necessarily rooted in reinterpretation of ideas already in existence, Schon 
points to the importance of metaphor in all conceptual change, by which he 
means applying to a new situation a word with a meaning that is considered 
by the thinker to be applicable in some way to the new situation. The light 
wave indicating the nature of the movement of light is a metaphor of 
this kind. 
Susanne Langer19 refers to the importance of non-verbal symbolic forms 
in man's interpretation of the external world, such as the Gestalt principles 
through which perception derives its structure. 
We believe that it may be concluded from the arguments presented by 
Schon and Langer that the scientist could effect no essential changes in his 
model if he lacked a certain verbal, visual and, possibly, auditive "power of 
imagination" which enables him to apply existing verbal, visual and auditive 
symbolic structures as analogies to situations in the external world for 
which he is seeking an explanation. The cultural areas in which verbal, 
visual and auditive symbols are very much in evidence as analogical means 
of giving expression to personal experience are poetry, the visual arts and 
music. 
Thus the capacity to apply symbolic structures as analogies to an object of 
research is in a certain sense an artistic capacity, which implies that 
original scientific creativity may be regarded as a form of artistic creative 
capacity. 
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Vf. Recapitulative typifieation of original and 
derived creative scientific thinking 
The original creative scientist has the capacity to develop ideas about the 
external world independently of his explicit model and to objectify those 
ideas in subsequent reflection. This leaves him free to note aspects of his 
world of experience which are at variance on essential points with his 
explicit model. He is aware of the separate existence of the five elements of 
his world of experience, tends slightly towards totalization and reification 
and is capable of building up analogies. These mental qualities enable him 
to construct new models to help explain aspects of the external world which 
are inconsistent with the old model. 
The scientist whose creativity is of the derived type has converted his 
explicit model in its entirety into an intrapsychic model, thus excluding all 
possibility of reflection. His thinking is confined to a thought circuit, which 
makes it difficult for him to note aspects of his world of experience which 
are inconsistent with that model. Being only vaguely aware of the separate 
existense of the five elements of his world of experience, he tends towards 
totalization and reification. His capacity for building up analogies is 
small. These mental qualities largely restrict his scientific creative capacity 
to adding deductive refinements to his model. 
The above typifieation permits us, we feel, to draw the following con-
clusions regarding the similarities and dissimilarities to be found in certain 
personality traits of the two types of scientist. 
The original creative thinker has a mind in which there is room for 
logical contradictions, such as those between the intrapsychic model and the 
explicit model, between the intrapsychic model and thought arising from 
reflection on it, the explicit model and what he perceives of the structure 
of the external world, and the intrapsychic model and his test results. We 
must also assume that he is capable of perceiving the elements of his world 
of experience on the basis of more than just the intrapsychic models which 
he has developed for each of those elements. For lack of a better, that 
"more than" will have to be described as "intuition". This entire constel-
lation of contents of thought relating to a given research object will only be 
brought into ultimate balance if these contents can be harmonized one 
with the other in accordance with the precepts of logic and scientific proof. 
The derived creative thinker is much more intolerant for harbouring such 
internally conflicting psychic constellations during a lenghty period of 
time and he brings them prematurely into balance with the aid of 
mental mechanisms which are inconsistent with the precepts of logic and 
scientific evidence. Milton J. Rosenberg,20 who investigated this pheno-
menon of longer-term intolerance for logical inconsistencies in connection 
with attitudinal constellations in general, comes to the conclusion that 
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people differ in their "threshold of intolerance for inconsistency" in those 
attitudinal aspects that are psychologically incompatible.21 
Our conclusions may be regarded as supporting his psychologically 
general thesis in the more limited area of logical consistency and inconsis-
tency. 
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